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Abstract 
 
Current thinking in major international development agencies construes community-based health 
insurance (CBHI) as a transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for health care in low-
income countries. The policy link between CBHI and universal coverage is implicitly determined by 
the historical experience of mutual health insurance in countries such as Germany and Japan in the 
19th century, where the socioeconomic context was dramatically different to that of today’s much less 
successful schemes. This paper argues that the economic and health system frameworks employed in 
the analysis of CBHI have not taken into account context-dependent considerations such as goals, 
values and power. It is proposed that a critical engagement with social capital theories could 
contribute to our understanding of why CBHI schemes do not appear on course to develop according 
to the 19th century precedent, achieving significant levels of population coverage in a sustainable way. 
A framework of social capital and economic development is used to organize and interpret existing 
evidence and information on CBHI. This process suggests that solidarity, trust, extra-community 
networks, vertical civil society links and state-society relations at the local level affect the possibility 
of success of CBHI. To this extent, it may be possible to talk of “social determinants of CBHI”. In 
order to align themselves to local community goals and values, CBHI schemes may need to actively 
foster certain types of vertical and horizontal bridging relations which could result in the evolution of 
structures and operations quite different to those proposed by current models of CBHI.  
 
Key words: community-based health insurance, social capital, trust, grass-roots organizations, NGOs, 
local government 
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1. Introduction 
 
Current thinking in major international development agencies construes community-based health 
insurance (CBHI) as a transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for health care in low-
income countries (World Health Organization., 2005, World Health Organization, 2000, Davies and 
Carrin, 2001, Grootaert, 2001). CBHI provides financial protection from the cost of seeking health 
care. It has three main features: prepayment for health care by the community members; community 
control; and voluntary membership (Hsiao, 2001) i. The policy link between CBHI and universal 
coverage is implicitly determined by the historical experience of mutual health insurance in Europe 
(Criel and Van Dormael, 1999, Barnighausen and Sauerborn, 2002, Cordery, 2003) and Japan (Ogawa 
et al., 2003) in the 19th century. Membership of 19th century mutual schemes grew and eventually they 
merged to form various types of national health insurance. Emerging in a different socioeconomic 
context, it is not safe to assume that CBHI schemes will develop according to the historical precedent. 
For example, although it is estimated that in West Africa there was more than a two-fold increase in 
the number of CBHI schemes in just three years, from 199 schemes in 2000 to 585 in 2003 (Bennett, 
2004b), this is still a small number of schemes when compared to the situation in Europeii. In the 19th 
century there were 27,000 friendly societies, which operated much like CBHI schemes, in the United 
Kingdom alone (Bennett, 2004b). Rather than being locally initiated by farmers, associations of 
industry workers or employers as in Europe and Japan, today’s CBHI schemes are mostly the result of 
top-down interventions led by foreign aid agencies or national governments (Meessen, 2002). 
Reviews have concluded that the evidence base on CBHI is limited in scope and quality (Ekman, 
2004) and that it is unclear whether CBHI schemes are actually sustainable in the long term (Bennett, 
2004b).  
 
Constraints to increasing CBHI coverage and sustainability have been identified primarily by a body 
of literature taking an economic or health system perspective. In agencies such as the World Bank and 
WHO, analysis of CBHI policy is underpinned by an economic framework, with discussion focusing 
on features of market transactions such as willingness-to-pay, information, price and quality (Dror, 
2001, Preker, 2004, Pauly, 2004, Zweifel, 2004). Another related perspective attempts to set financial 
transactions into the broader institutional context of the health system, analysing interactions between 
insureds, insurance schemes, health service providers and the state. This is described here as a “health 
system framework” (see for example (Bennett, 2004a, Bennett, 2004b, Criel et al., 2004, ILO, 2002)) 
and it corresponds with the model of health system analysis laid out in the WHO World Health Report 
2000 (World Health Organization, 2000). Ultimately underpinning both the economic and health 
systems frameworks is the behavioural model of utility maximizing homo economicus. This paper 
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argues that this model does not permit the systematic incorporation of social context into policy. New 
directions in thinking on CBHI policy are needed; particularly an increased focus on values, goals and 
power relations, as has been argued in relation to social policy in general (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
Specifically, it is proposed that a critical engagement with social capital theories could contribute to 
our understanding of why CBHI schemes do not appear on course to develop according to the 19th 
century precedent, achieving significant levels of population coverage in a sustainable way.  
 
Social capital has been the subject of spirited academic debate for almost two decades. Since its 
definition remains under dispute, as a matter of convenience we employ the following as a point of 
departure for discussion: “the information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social 
network” (Woolcock, 1998):153. Further categories in the social capital taxonomy are considered later 
in the paper. At least ten years ago empirical studies began to suggest that higher levels of social 
capital are positively correlated with improved development outcomes in areas such as agriculture, 
water and sanitation and microcredit in low-income countries (Brown and Ashman, 1996, Narayan, 
1997). The World Bank’s ‘Social Capital Initiative’ even suggested that social capital could be the 
‘missing link’ between natural, physical and human capital and economic growth and development 
(Grootaert, 2001). Theories of social capital have also been applied widely in public health policy. 
(See (Moore et al., 2006) and (Shortt, 2004) for a literature review). However, although an important 
component of social capital, trust, is occasionally discussed in the CBHI literature, CBHI has not, for 
the most part, engaged with social capital theories. In the few cases where social capital theory is 
considered, it is either mentioned only cursorily, or the richness and complexity of the theory is 
overlooked.  
 
The specific framework of social capital adopted in this paper was developed by Woolcock 
(Woolcock, 1998, Woolcock, 2001). It brings together several theories of social capital and draws on 
quantitative and qualitative evidence from field studies. Its particular advantage for our analysis is its 
focus on community level economic development projects in low-income countries, similar to 
CBHIiii. It offers CBHI policy a framework that incorporates both economic and social theory by 
attempting to reconcile debates over whether humans are rational agents or governed by norms and 
culture. In doing so, the social capital framework can be viewed as an attempt to pragmatically 
address the need for an alternative to income-based and purely economic approaches to development 
(Bebbington, 2004). By applying this framework to CBHI analysis, this paper aims to develop a 
methodology for grounding it in context-dependent considerations such as values, community goals 
and local power relations.  
 
 5
We draw on Woolcock’s social capital framework which is briefly outlined below. The social capital 
framework is used to organize and interpret evidence and information on CBHI. Since an empirical 
study identifying the causal links between social capital and CBHI is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we draw on existing studies of CBHI. Finally, there is a discussion of the possible importance of 
social capital to the implementation of CBHI and gaps in current knowledge on this subject.   
 
2. Social capital: a policy framework 
 
The concept of social capital was popularised in social science by Robert Putnam (Putnam et al., 
1993, Putnam, 1995, Putnam, 2000). He conceives of social capital as a ‘stock’ that is the property of 
a group or community, district or even nation and constitutes features of social organization - 
“networks, norms, and social ties that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” 
(Putnam, 1995): 67. He argues that informal networks of civic engagement build social capital which 
in turn facilitates improved governance (Putnam et al., 1993). By conceiving of social capital as a 
‘stock’ Putnam made a theoretical diversion from the principal preceding theories of social capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986, Coleman, 1990, Coleman, 1988) attracting criticism for over-simplification (Fischer, 
2005, Harriss, 2002, Portes, 2000). Previous social capital theorists (Bourdieu, 1986, Coleman, 1988, 
Coleman, 1990) had conceptualised social capital as a resource for individuals which is socially 
structured - see for example Coleman’s definition - “social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988): S98 - and it is this version of social capital that is 
employed in Woolcock’s policy framework (Woolcock, 2001, Woolcock, 1998). The framework 
constitutes four types of social capital: (i) bonding social capital inhering in micro level intra-
community ties; (ii) bridging social capital inhering in micro level extra-community networks; (iii) 
bridging social capital inhering in relations between communities and macro-level state institutions; 
and (iv) bonding social capital inhering in macro level social relations within public institutions. A 
synthesized (and simplified) version of the framework is presented below.  
 
2.1 Bonding social capital at the micro level: relations within communities  
Bonding social capital, the first category in Woolcock’s framework, inheres in dense networks within 
communities. It constitutes expectations between individuals, the trustworthiness of structures, 
information channels, norms and effective sanctions that can prevent unproductive behaviour in 
individuals (Coleman, 1988). In this sense social capital “is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Coleman, 1988): S98 (for 
example doing well at school). The concept of bonding social capital has been employed in studies to 
understand why some immigrant groups in the USA fared better than others in economic development 
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(for example setting up small businesses and enterprises) (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993, Portes, 
1998). It was found that in some contexts groups characterized by high levels of bonding social capital 
could provide enterprising individuals with psychological support and high levels of trust, lowering 
the transaction costs in enterprise.  
 
However, as well as identifying the merits of bonding social capital, research into US immigrant 
groups also suggested that the same attributes of the normative structure that made the accumulation 
of human and economic capital possible (trust, social support etc) were in some settings unproductive, 
permitting free-riding on communal resources by less diligent members of the group (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). In this paper, this is characterized as the "negative" effect of social capital. 
 
2.2 Bridging social capital at the micro level: relations across communities  
Research in the US found that successful (productive) immigrant groups were characterized by 
individuals who were able to draw on bridging linkages outside the network as well as bonding ties. 
This was thought to be because extra-community networks were larger and free from the (potentially 
overwhelming) demands family and friends place on successful members of the groups for support. 
This permitted exchange to take place on the basis of formal rules or fair market competition. The 
conclusion was that individuals need to be able to draw on strong intra-community bonding ties and 
extra-community bridging linkages to balance them out in order to prevent the negative effect of 
social capital, namely free-riding and corruption (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). This led to the 
idea that there must be two basic dimensions of social capital at the community level - bonding and 
bridging - the latter constituting the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in 
generalized, formal, extra-community networks (Woolcock 1998, 2001). 
 
Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu, 1986) theory of social capital, which influenced the American research on 
immigrants, elucidates why some groups may be unable to accumulate and employ bridging networks. 
He argued that individuals and families who already hold forms of capital (of which according to 
Bourdieu there are four types - economic, social, cultural and symbolic) are strategically adept at 
accumulating and transforming it (he argues the types of capital are fungible) and may consciously 
and unconsciously do so. Bourdieu sees economic accumulation as part of a general process of 
accumulating social connections, education, titles or names or even dispositions of the mind or body 
which all reinforce each other. Individuals and families that do not possess the various types of capital 
are from the outset in a disadvantaged position to accumulate it.  
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Woolcock has been criticized for omitting Bourdieu from his social capital framework (Harriss, 2002) 
and accused of ignoring structural social inequalities, thereby reinforcing a conservative development 
agenda (Harriss, 2002, Harriss, 1997). However, a careful interpretation of Woolcock’s framework 
suggests that Bourdieu’s ideas do have a significant (albeit indirect) influence on it by way of the 
central position given to the findings of the American research on immigrants (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). As already discussed, this research found that social structures are able to 
constrain as well as advance individual action.  
 
2.3 Bridging social capital at the macro level: relations between communities and state 
institutions 
Research into the relationship between social capital, government structures and development 
outcomes in low-income countries found that “Norms of cooperation and networks of civic 
engagement among ordinary citizens can be promoted by public agencies and used for developmental 
ends” (Evans, 1996): 1119. This idea, which is construed by Woolcock as bridging social capital at 
the macro level, takes up Putnam’s theory that social capital is instrumental in promoting effective 
government (Putnam et al., 1993) but reverses it. Rather than focusing on the idea that links between 
groups and public institutions ensure that public policy is a collective good that benefits all, the 
research underlines the importance of direct involvement of public officials in getting citizen efforts 
organized and sustaining citizen involvement. This moves beyond traditional analyses where the role 
of the state is to provide public goods and an enabling rule of law. There are difficulties with this idea, 
which are addressed in the next subsection. 
 
2.4 Bonding social capital at the macro level: relations within institutions 
Powerful institutions which transcend the public-private divide, such as governments, can potentially 
be vehicles for corruption and nepotism. The key to preventing this is a competent, engaged set of 
public institutions (Evans, 1996). Here, social capital constitutes a professional ethos committed to 
pursuing collective goals, fostered by social relations between individual representatives of 
institutions; it is a form of bonding social capital at the macro level (Woolcock 1998, 2001). It has 
been pointed out that since coherent robust bureaucracies rarely exist in developing countries, the 
premise behind advocacy for state/society bridging social capital is flawed (Harriss, 2002), although 
this is probably an overly pessimistic view. 
 
Regarding the four types of social capital in the framework, Woolcock (Woolcock, 1998): 186 argues 
that “All four dimensions must be present for optimal developmental outcomes. This successful 
interaction within and between bottom-up and top-down initiatives is the cumulative product of an 
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ongoing process that entails “getting the social relations right””. The following section explores to 
what extent CBHI policy has been "getting social relations right" by analyzing CBHI through the lens 
of each of the four types of social capital in Woolcock’s framework.  
 
3. Understanding the feasibility of CBHI through the lens of the social capital framework 
 
By reviewing the CBHI literature, we identified a core set of studies that consider the social context of 
CBHI schemes (Atim, 1999, Bloom and Shenglan, 1999, Criel and Waelkens, 2003, Dror, 2002, 
Franco, 2004, Hsiao, 2001, Jowett, 2003, Kiwanuka-Mukiibi, 2005, Meessen, 2002, Ron, 1999, 
Schneider, 2004, Zhang et al., 2006). In the remainder of the paper, the adapted, simplified version of 
Woolcock’s framework is populated with these studies. The framework is used to organise the CBHI 
studies and extrapolate from them. We also draw on other literature on CBHI, literature on other types 
of health insurance, and social capital literature outside the health field to develop the analysis. From 
this, we tentatively assess whether there is value in applying social capital theories to the formation 
and evaluation of CBHI policies.  
  
3.1 Micro level bonding social capital: positive and negative effects on CBHI 
 
3.1.1 Positive bonding social capital: constraining adverse selection and moral hazard and 
increasing willingness to pay? 
The growth in interest in CBHI is linked to the failure of governments in low-income countries to 
implement compulsory health insurance for all or most of the population. However, the voluntary 
nature of CBHI gives rise to serious obstacles, particularly adverse selection. Other obstacles, such as 
moral hazard, are common to all forms of health insurance. In CBHI in particular, low demand and 
willingness to pay also pose a problem (Bennett, 1998, Meessen, 2002). In order to counteract adverse 
selection, it is suggested in the economic literature on CBHI that contracts are designed to ensure: a 
minimum enrollment rate in the target population; waiting periods so as to prevent people from 
joining a scheme only when they are ill; and enrollment not on an individual basis but rather on a 
family basis (Carrin, 2003). Ex-ante moral hazard may be uncommon in low-income countries since 
the costs associated with accessing health services are sufficient to deter increased ‘frivolous’ 
utilisation (World Health Organization, 2000). However ex-post moral hazard is likely where CBHI 
schemes cover minor conditions and decisions to utilize services are driven by the client rather than 
the provider (Bennett, 1998). Following the economic framework, this can be addressed by 
introducing deductibles, copayments and/or gatekeepers as part of the contract (Hsiao, 1995). 
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Charges, although increasing a scheme’s sustainability by limiting claims, can harm vertical equity 
since they disproportionately affect the poor (Ranson, 2002a).  
 
It has been suggested that informal mechanisms depending on social norms at the local level may be 
more equitable and efficient than the formal, contract-based ways of combating fraud. This is 
recognized in the economic literature on CBHI when it is suggested that trust mitigates fraud in CBHI 
(Pauly, 2004, Pauly et al., 2006) and that CBHI covering small pools provides informal safeguards 
against fraud, such as full information and social sanctions (Davies and Carrin, 2001, Zweifel, 2004). 
However, in these papers, although the importance of trust is highlighted, it is unsupported by any 
kind of evidence or example from CBHI experience and it receives no analytical development, since 
there is no economic theory of trust (a limitation recognized by Pauly (Pauly, 2004)). Therefore, while 
the economic analysis of adverse selection in CBHI is useful, it has not been sufficient.   
 
Other studies of CBHI taking a “health system” perspective also propose that trust decreases the 
likelihood of fraud and increases willingness to pay. These do provide examples from the field and 
propose strategies to increase levels of trust, including: improving behaviour of medical staff to 
patients, such as increased levels of politeness (Criel and Waelkens, 2003); improving quality of care 
(through strategic purchasing) (Schneider, 2005); transparency and accountability among those 
managing the scheme (Schneider, 2005); recourse to justice to punish fraud (Schneider, 2004, 
Meessen, 2002); subsidies for the poor (Schneider, 2005); increased community participation in 
scheme management (Schneider, 2001, Hsiao, 2001, Atim, 1999); scheme meetings; and a significant 
proportion of staff working voluntarily (Atim, 1999, Schneider, 2001). However, the analysis is 
confined to investigating how trust could be produced and employed at various points in the the 
consumer-provider-insurance triangle. These discussions of trust do not take into account the broader 
social context and how this may affect CBHI. For example, in a study of the role of trust in CBHI in 
Rwanda (Schneider, 2005), the possibility that solidarity among scheme members affects willingness 
to pay is discussed without any mention of the specific nature and possible root of this solidarity. The 
socially determined values and norms that form the context of CBHI and may influence it in practice 
are left largely unexamined. For example, no mention is made of the effect on trust among scheme 
members of the civil war and genocide that occurred less than a decade before the study took place. 
Ethnic fragmentation has been associated with decreased local public good provision in Kenya 
(Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), decreased levels of group participation in the US (Alesina and Ferrara, 
2000) and increased informal sector activity and decreased tax compliance in 52 countries (Lassen, 
2003) to name but a few studies of the effect of ethnicity on trust. Experience from these studies 
suggests that CBHI may be hampered by ethnic fragmentation, but almost no studies of CBHI, even in 
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contexts of great ethnic diversity such as in many African societies, have investigated the effect of 
ethnicity on trust among potential scheme members. 
 
One exception is a study comparing a hospital-based scheme in Ghana with a scheme based in a city 
in Cameroon where membership was based on ethnic affiliation (Atim, 1999). It attempts to test the 
theory that solidarity and the smallness of CBHI schemes can account for successful CBHI. It found 
that the bonds of ethnic urban solidarity networks represent an effort to re-create or utilise rural 
solidarity mechanisms as an insurance against the risks of modern urban life. Ethnic bonds linked 
members in the Cameroonian scheme and, through the CBHI scheme, created a “social movement 
dynamic”. The paper concludes that this alone did not necessarily account for their success, arguing 
that a scheme without ethnic bonds can incorporate elements of a social movement such as greater 
community participation, accountability and autonomy, in the course of time enhancing the likelihood 
of success. Echoing this, studies outside the CBHI literature have suggested that the negative effects 
of ethnic fragmentation on trust could be mitigated through improved institution building (Miguel, 
2004, Easterly, 2001).  
 
Ideas that trust and solidarity bonds in the community improve the likelihood of success in CBHI have 
parallels with the theory that bonding social capital decreases fraud and increases economic 
development, described in the previous sectioniv. However, research in China (Hsiao, 2001, Zhang et 
al., 2006) is one of only two explicit attempts take this up and measure the effect of social capital on 
CBHI (the other is a study in Vietnam (Jowett, 2003) (see below). In the Chinese research, social 
capital is employed only in the Putnamian sense to mean a stock of “social cohesion and solidarity”. It 
was found that social capital facilitated collective action, which in turn facilitated willingness to pay. 
A statistically significant association between indicators of social capital (degrees of trust and 
reciprocity) and farmers’ willingness to join community financing was demonstrated, controlling for 
other socio-demographic characteristics (Zhang et al., 2006). According to Hsiao (Hsiao, 2001), the 
pathway linking levels of trust and reciprocity to willingness to pay in the Chinese schemes is that 
members with higher levels of solidarity are more ready to accept the cross-subsidization which is 
implicit in the insurance mechanism. CBHI is therefore viewed as a form of collective action. A study 
in Guinea-Conarky demonstrating that scheme members understand and approve of the re-distributive 
effects of CBHI (Criel and Waelkens, 2003) supports this view. Other studies have recognized the 
‘collective action’ effect and suggested emphasizing the solidarity benefits of health insurance in 
information disseminated to communities (Desmet et al., 1999, Schneider, 2005). 
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There is limited evidence then, that in at least in some CBHI schemes, willingness to pay is increased 
by solidarity bonds and cannot be purely understood in neoclassical economic terms, where 
willingness to pay is based on individual expected utility. Instead, a complex interplay between 
rational utility maximising and socio-cultural norms (such as solidarity, collective action) probably 
affects individuals’ decisions to join a scheme (Schneider, 2004). This is because eventually 
benefiting from the scheme (by drawing on the insurance in times of illness) depends on need rather 
than the amount contributed. This is true of all types of insurance, but in a community setting, the 
redistributive effect may be more apparent to scheme members. Also enhancing the importance of  
solidarity in CBHI is that insurance may have a different logic from more traditional community-
based forms of risk management and income smoothing mechanisms such as rotating credit 
associations which are based on a notion of reciprocity (you get out what you put in) (Criel and 
Waelkens, 2003). (See (Sorensen, 2000) for a discussion of risk management in rural communities in 
developing countries).  
 
3.1.2 Negative role of bonding social capital 
The hypothesis that strong intra-group ties mitigate against adverse selection and moral hazard echoes 
Putnam and Coleman by assuming that social capital has only a positive, normative effect on social 
relations. However, there is a second argument in the CBHI literature that turns this hypothesis on its 
head and holds that strong intra-group bonds actually prevent the emergence of successful CBHI 
(Meessen, 2002, Atim, 1999, Jowett, 2003). An example of this comes from Ghana where, in the face 
of conflicting loyalties between a CBHI scheme and members of their community, field assistants 
apparently connived with community members in the practice of evading the stipulation of family 
membership, a mechanism designed to prevent adverse selection (Atim, 1999).  
 
Also supporting the negative view of social capital, Jowett (Jowett, 2003), using data from voluntary 
health insurance (which operates much like CBHI) in Vietnamese provinces, takes issue with Hsiao’s 
(Hsiao, 2001) argument that social capital facilitates collective action and willingness to pay. The 
results of Jowett’s study, which controls for a range of health and socio-economic variables, showed 
that high levels of two proxies of social capital - perceptions of social cohesion and informal financial 
networks - were correlated with lower, not higher, rates of take-up of community-based voluntary 
health insurance, suggesting that intra-community bonding social capital ‘crowds out’ voluntary 
health insurance. In this instance strong intra-community ties apparently favoured informal financial 
networks such as borrowing money that prevented more formal and institutionalized types of 
mechanisms such as CBHI from emerging. The Ghanaian and Vietnamese studies, then, fit into the 
 12
section of the social capital framework that suggests that high levels of bonding social capital permit 
free-riding and prevent formal rules for market transactions from being enforced. 
 
There are therefore two countervailing (positive and negative) views of the effect of bonding social 
capital on CBHI in the literature. As we have seen, this is consistent with the social capital framework 
which provides the basis for an alternative, third hypothesis: communities with both strong intra-
community ties (promoting solidarity) and extra-community networks (promoting a willingness to 
invest in and draw on a larger, more generalized and formal pool of resources) are probably more 
likely to experience greater success with CBHI than communities with one or neither types of social 
capital. Communities with only strong intra-community ties may actually be disadvantaged and may 
benefit from investing in mechanisms to strengthen the other type.  
 
3.2 Micro level bridging social capital: the effect of vertical and horizontal civil society links 
on CBHI 
An important issue for policy makers is whether it would be possible to aid communities in 
constructing social capital to create better conditions for CBHI, without embarking on some form of 
social engineering. Affective and emotional relations between family and neighbours are probably not 
the types of social relations that can or should be developed through policy. However, bridging social 
capital may be ‘constructible’ since it constitutes social links that are facilitated by formalized or 
institutional arrangements (Bebbington, 2000, Krishna, 2004, Putzel, 1997, Fox, 1996, Evans, 1996).  
 
3.2.1 Horizontal civil society links: facilitating the enlargement of the risk pool 
In the context of CBHI, enlarging the risk pool has already been interpreted as a case of constructing 
bridging social capital (Preker et al., 2002). Establishing and strengthening links with formal financing 
networks is cited as an example. In Rwanda federations of smaller CBHI schemes pool part of their 
funds at the district level to cover care in district hospitals (Schneider, 2001). Creating horizontal links 
through scheme mergers in this way allows schemes to expand the risk pool while continuing to 
capitalize on the positive social bonds fostered by small risk groupsv (Davies and Carrin, 2001). 
Larger pools are required in order to: spread risk; actuarially correctly assess the probability of the 
loss occurring and therefore maintain solvency; cross-subsidize (Schieber, 1997) and lower 
transaction costs (Ron, 1999). 
 
Another mechanism for facilitating the enlargement of the risk pool without increasing the risk of 
fraud is “the establishment of supervisory and audit bodies, and support for an independent press and 
for the professional groups involved” (Meessen, 2002): 90-91. Such interventions are proposed as a 
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method of fostering an enhanced "generalized morality" across CBHI schemes, or identity or loyalty 
within a large reference group that encompasses all relevant market transactions (Meessen, 2002) - in 
short, the development of bridging social capital. Such a professional body has already been 
established in one region of Senegal. The GRAIM (Groupe de Recherche et d’Appui aux Initiatives 
Mutualistes) coordinates 21 schemes, supporting development and building capacity and seems to 
have led to more interest in scheme membership (Bennett, 2004b). These are confined to building 
links between schemes and other formal institutions in the health system. However some studies have 
suggested that horizontal linkages between small scale community projects can be even more effective 
when they connect heterogeneous organizations, building bridges across different sectors.  
 
From the social capital literature, federations of coffee producers and other rural development projects 
in the Andes (Bebbington, 2000) may provide a useful model for CBHI. Federations are defined by 
Bebbington and Carroll (Bebbington, 2000) as supra-communal organizations of the poor constituting 
a special manifestation of social capital. Federations were found to have the potential to foster 
regional and more strategic forms of collective action and engagement with government, civil society 
and markets and to build sustainable bridges between different types of organization. Links between 
political and economic organizations were particularly important. The former type of organization was 
often more adept at lobbying and mobilization to protect and promote particular concerns of its 
members, while the latter type (which would include CBHI schemes), was concerned with social 
enterprise and facilitating service delivery and was more pragmatic, but less inclusive in its stance. 
Successful federations were able to develop bridges between different types of organization, so that 
they were able to benefit from each others’ strengths.  
 
The idea that CBHI schemes could be situated in the context of a regional or even national 
development agenda via strategically formed linkages with other grassroots organizations, particularly 
political ones, has not been proposed in the CBHI literature. This could be a missed opportunity, 
particularly in contexts where membership is drawn from poorer sections of society with a weak 
capacity for mobilization. How far it would be possible to build such relationships would depend 
greatly on the political and leadership dynamics at work in the region. This conceptualization of CBHI 
entails a broader and deeper consideration of communities’ needs, goals and power relations than is 
currently evident in the CBHI literature.  
 
3.2.2 Vertical bridging linkages: the role of NGOs in capacity building  
Vertical linkages, in the form of support from overseas agencies, are probably more common than 
horizontal linkages in CBHI. Vertical linkages are employed by CBHI schemes to build capacity in 
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technical areas such as financial and general management and in administration, since the requisite 
skills for implementing CBHI are often not available locally (Bennett, 1998). In an exploratory study 
comparing a successful CBHI scheme in the Philippines and a less successful one in Guatemala (Ron, 
1999), one of the major success factors in the Philippines (where the scheme grew steadily over three 
years) may have been bridging social capital constructed through several types of vertical links. A 
very effective administrative structure was provided by the international NGO Organization for 
Education Resources and Training (ORT). The structure was developed through the built-in members’ 
participation mechanisms within a cooperative structure, combined with the financial and moral 
support given by the ORT country office and ultimately the World ORT Union. The Guatemalan 
scheme, despite receiving superior technical assistance from the WHO, failed to progress after initial 
registration, partly because it did not develop supportive links with local social and political 
structures. In particular, the scheme lacked the support of the local Catholic Church. It could be 
argued then, that the scheme did not develop sufficient bridging social capital. Perhaps supporting the 
case for the importance of bridging capital is the fact that following the publication of the study, the 
Guatemalan scheme was successfully re-launched, this time with the support of Catholic Church 
(personal communication, Dr. Aviva Ron, 2006). However, further research would be needed to 
assess whether bridging social capital actually affected the outcome of the schemes in the longer term.  
 
While the potential of NGOs to assist CBHI may be great, the provision of technical assistance to 
community development projects may actually prevent the accumulation of social capital at the 
grassroots, jeopardising their sustainability. This may occur when vertical bridging relations cause 
dependency through top-down, non-participatory interventions (Abom, 2004, Fox, 1996). Echoing 
this argument, it has been found that community participation in CBHI is essential to scheme 
sustainability (Kiwanuka-Mukiibi, 2005, Franco, 2004). One in-depth study of community 
participation in CBHI schemes, focusing on Senegal, found that participation has a tendency to wane 
over time,. Increased decentralization and training are suggested as potential solutions (Franco, 2004). 
The example of a South African HIV/AIDS prevention project which had exceptionally strong 
technical and financial external support but failed due to poor community participation might offer 
further insights into addressing waning community participation in CBHI (Campbell, 2003). In this 
project, participatory management by a multi-stakeholder committee aimed to empower key 
marginalised groups (notably sex workers) and to facilitate collective action. However, it failed to take 
into account the impact of broader social forces on the community (for example poverty) and social 
hierarchies (for example gender relations) and therefore did not create appropriate incentives for 
participation. Efforts to support community participation were undermined by experts possessing 
technical and scientific know-how (epidemiology and biomedicine). Their knowledge was given 
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symbolic and real precedence in the programme, so objectives articulated by them displaced the 
objectives of the intended “beneficiaries”. Drawing on Bourdieu, the analysis attributes this failure to 
unequal distributions of economic, cultural, symbolic and social capital in the project which favoured 
the technical project staff and not the local community.  
 
Where participation has been studied in CBHI, there has been no significant analysis of power 
relations between technical experts and the community in defining appropriate incentives. Indeed, a 
recent study of CBHI found that incentives that are socially and politically relevant may be at variance 
with incentives designed using technical and scientific expertise (such as economic theory) (De 
Allegri et al., 2006). Employing a social capital framework may help address this. A consequence of 
defining incentives in a participatory, “bottom-up” fashion may be the development of scheme 
structures and activities that fall outside the classic insurance model. For example, in Uganda, low 
ability to pay premiums led to interest among members in pursuing income generation activities to 
supplement premium payments and the CBHI scheme becoming an income generating business, as 
well as an insurance house (Derriennic, 2005).  
 
3.3 Macro level bridging social capital: the effect of synergy on CBHI 
There are several views on the appropriate role of the state in CBHI. Pauly (Pauly et al., 2006) has 
recently advocated minimal government regulation of CBHI, arguing that government subsidy causes 
cream skimming and adverse selection. The health system framework suggests that although CBHI is 
a private sector method of financing health care, the government can play a vital role in schemes’ 
success, should it decide that CBHI is a good strategy to further its objectives. Bennett et al (Bennett, 
1998) argue that if there is government failure, or no clear government policy, schemes are likely to 
play an important role in the delivery of health care, but issues relating their role in the broader health 
system are unlikely to be relevant. If government is strong, they argue that CBHI relations with the 
government are likely to be very important. The following three government mechanisms for 
supporting community health financing have been identified: stewardship (for example regulation and 
monitoring); creating an enabling environment (for example the rule of law); and resource transfer 
(for example subsidies) (Ranson, 2002b). The social capital literature complicates this picture. Evans 
(Evans, 1996) argues that state agencies can aid civil society organizations to consolidate themselves 
through the construction of state-society “synergy” and that the state plays two different roles in this: 
complementarity and embeddedness.  
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3.3.1 Complementarity 
The first is the classic role of the state, akin to the health system approach described above, namely to 
provide public goods and an enabling rule of law while private organizations and institutions produce 
goods and services. This is termed “complementarity” by Evans.  
 
Complementarity is important in CBHI. For example, a major obstacle to CBHI is the poor quality of 
health services (Criel and Waelkens, 2003). CBHI can potentially contribute to improving quality, 
efficiency and sustainability of health services through strategic purchasing (World Health 
Organization, 2000, Hsiao, 2001). In health care markets CBHI can be a means of facilitating 
improved vertical integration and determining the nature and scope of the products supplied by health 
care providers (Zweifel, 2004). If the provider is separate from the purchaser, an insurance body can 
improve efficiency and curb provider moral hazard (Atim, 2001) if it pursues a policy of strategic 
purchasing (World Health Organization, 2000). However, for strategic purchasing there must be an 
enabling environment: information about the quality and quantity of services must be provided; there 
needs to be investment in new skills in contracting on the part of both the purchaser and provider 
(Bennett et al., 1997); and a revision of the balance of power between purchaser and provider must be 
accepted (Desmet et al., 1999, Meessen, 2002). In light of these numerous preconditions, it is not 
surprising then that in a study of 258 CBHI schemes in low-income countries only 16% conducted 
strategic purchasing (ILO, 2002). One method of creating these conditions is for government to 
provide the function of monitoring, regulating and / or accrediting providers, so that schemes do not 
need to develop the technical skills to conduct these activities themselves. China’s rural cooperative 
medical system (RCMS) provides an example of complementarityvi. Since China’s health services 
have become decentralized, local government has less financial leverage to control the running of 
hospitals and other facilities. The role of government is increasingly to monitor and regulate services. 
RCMS schemes, on the other hand, channel financial resources to hospitals and local government, but 
do not have the technical skills to assess quality and cost-effectiveness. Local government and RCMS 
schemes therefore need to cooperate in order to influence providers through strategic purchasing 
(Bloom and Shenglan, 1999). 
 
3.3.2 Constructing social capital through embeddedness  
The second role of the government is "embeddedness", a process of constructing social capital at the 
local level (Evans, 1996)vii. Central to this is the idea that there is an informal permeability of 
boundaries between civil society and private sector organizations and the government that can 
facilitate development. It is often assumed that such permeability should be avoided as it can foster 
corruption, but Evans argues that embeddedness can significantly enhance development. An 
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engagement with civil society or the private sector in the form of day-to-day interactions of 
government officials can build its own, positive, norms and loyalties (Evans, 1996). An example 
comes from the Taiwanese irrigation system where the water requirement per crop in Taiwan is 
around 50% lower than in other south east Asian countries. This efficiency is attributed to the 
embeddedness of the state in society at the local level (Lam, 1996). Local public officials belonging to 
Irrigation Associations (IA) officially manage the irrigation system but are embedded in the day-to-
day operations of the farming groups. Officials depend on voluntary labour and donations by farmers 
to carry out maintenance and operations, while farmers depend on officials to integrate local needs 
into the overall plan. Officials gauge these needs not through the formal mechanism of farmers’ 
representatives, but through informal conversations held while collecting water fees. Although these 
mechanisms are informal, Lam argues that they have not evolved by chance. Rather, they are fostered 
by the institutional design of the irrigation system. Autonomy of the various units within the irrigation 
bureaucracy coupled with back-up from higher levels of authority allows individual officials to 
develop informal rules to cope with various problems they might face without this informality 
becoming unmanageable or corrupt. In short, embeddedness can be constructed by institutional 
structures which are designed to encourage a certain set of norms and loyalties at the intersection 
between civil society and government involvement in development projects (Evans, 1996).  
 
Research into state-society synergy would be particularly important in countries intending to follow 
the 19th century precedent and scale up coverage by integrating CBHI into government-led national 
social health insurance schemes, such as Ghana (Government of Ghana, 2003), since in these contexts 
issues of power between regulatory state officials and CBHI schemes will become paramount. 
Synergy may also be important in contexts where ability to pay is very low. CBHI has not experienced 
significant and sustained success in improving access and financial protection among indigents 
(World Health Organization, 2000) because (a) the poor are excluded from CBHI schemes because 
they cannot pay the premium or (b) the poor under-utilize services even if they have coverage 
(Ranson, 2002a, Atim, 2001). It is likely that indigents need to be subsidized by the state, while the 
rural non-poor and informal workers are targeted to make contributions to CBHI (Bennett, 2004b). In 
such scenarios, following the social capital framework, it may be advisable to construct administrative 
structures in CBHI that intersect with local political structures in order to facilitate bureaucrats’ 
loyalty and enthusiasm to become "embedded" in schemes and put their energy into making them 
work. For example, one Senegalese scheme developed a successful collaboration in which rural 
councillors are members of the scheme and they support its functioning by letting the manager make 
presentations at their meetings and by raising awareness and asking people to join the scheme while 
they are making their own visits to local communities (Franco, 2004). If governments are to have a 
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role in facilitating CBHI by constructing state-society “synergy”, public institutions need to be 
competent and engaged. This is the subject of the next subsection. 
 
3.4 Macro level bonding social capital: the effect of organisational integrity on CBHI 
Woolcock (Woolcock, 1998) defines organizational integrity as a type of social capital. He draws on 
neo-Weberian theory in perceiving institutional coherence, competence and capacity as deriving from 
an organizational form that socialises bureaucrats. This allows Woolcock to view the effectiveness of 
organizations, particularly government, as a product of social relations which foster a certain set of 
norms. 
 
The corporately coherent robust Weberian bureaucracy in the Taiwanese irrigation system (Lam, 
1996) ensured that embeddedness did not degenerate into clientalism, while at the local level the 
bureaucracy was open to inputs from farmers and local officials (Evans, 1996). Evans (Evans, 1996) 
argues that without a coherent Weberian bureaucracy (characterized by meritocratic recruitment, good 
salaries, sharp sanctions against violations of organizational norms and solid rewards for career-long 
performance) state-society synergy is possible but it will not be a force for good and will foster 
corruption instead. On the other hand, if a Weberian bureaucracy exists without synergy, inflexible 
rules and uniform structures (a Weberian “iron cage”) will prevent synergy and limit the possibilities 
for development. In other words, both synergy and coherent robust bureaucracy are needed for 
optimal developmental results. To support his argument Evans points to studies demonstrating that 
"synergy" contributed to the success of east Asian countries that experienced rapid development in the 
late 20th century. Thus Evans diverges from Putnam’s view that a lack of prior endowments of micro 
level bonding social capital is the key constraint to effective local government (Putnam et al., 1993), 
arguing rather that the limits in government structures cause the inability to scale-up micro levels of 
social capital (through state-society synergy) to generate action on a scale that is politically and 
economically efficacious. Applying Evans’ argument to CBHI cautions that local government will not 
be able to facilitate CBHI by constructing state-society “synergy” unless it is competent and engaged. 
 
4. Conclusions 
CBHI has been proposed as a transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for health care 
in low-income countries (World Health Organization., 2005, World Health Organization, 2000, 
Davies and Carrin, 2001, Grootaert, 2001). The policy link between CBHI and universal coverage is 
implicitly determined by the historical experience of mutual health insurance in countries such as 
Germany and Japan in the 19th century, where the social context was dramatically different to that of 
today’s, much less successful schemes. This paper argues that the analysis of CBHI in agencies such 
 19
as the World Bank and WHO, broadly based on economic theory, has been unable to take into account 
context-dependent policy considerations. These include values of scheme members and people in their 
communities, community goals and local and regional power relations. There is a need to develop an 
alternative framework to complement the economic and health system approaches to analyzing CBHI.  
 
Analysing the CBHI literature suggests that a critical engagement with social capital theories could 
contribute to our understanding of CBHI. Social capital theory could help explain why schemes do not 
appear on course to develop according to the 19th century precedent, achieving significant levels of 
population coverage in a sustainable way. Solidarity, trust, extra-community networks, vertical civil 
society links and state-society relations at the local level appear to affect significantly outcomes in 
CBHI. To this extent, it may be possible to talk of “social determinants of CBHI”. However, these 
social determinants have not been considered in CBHI policy in a systematic way, possibly limiting 
the development and success of CBHI. These conclusions are not based on the findings of primary 
research, which was beyond the scope of this paper. The limitation of this is that the studies employed 
do not necessarily aim to identify the importance of social capital. We have therefore been compelled 
to draw additional conclusions beyond the objectives of the researchers, by linking their work to a 
new framework. With this caveat in place, possible social determinants of CBHI and their impact on 
CBHI are summarized here.  
 
We first argue that applying Woolcock’s (Woolcock, 1998) social capital framework to the CBHI data 
puts into question the idea, proposed in the CBHI literature, that schemes characterized by strong 
intra-community ties are more likely to experience success in CBHI than those without these ties, 
because of increased solidarity which may reduce adverse selection and moral hazard. The framework 
complicates the picture by proposing that communities characterized by only strong intra-community 
ties may actually be disadvantaged in CBHI development due to increased levels of corruption and 
clientism, or a preference for more informal financial networks. A broader understanding of the 
factors determining the effect of bonding social capital on CBHI is therefore needed. Bridging social 
capital in the form of more extensive professional links with NGOs, umbrella organizations or local 
government (within and beyond the health sector) is likely to be important.  
 
Bridging ties are ‘constructible’ since they constitute social relations that are facilitated by 
institutional arrangements rather than affective bonds (Bebbington, 2000, Krishna, 2004, Putzel, 1997, 
Fox, 1996, Evans, 1996). They can foster more professional relations, strategic alliances, 
administrative capacity and enlarged risk pools in CBHI schemes. However, vertical links with NGOs, 
while bringing many benefits, may also foster dependency and may reinforce social structures that 
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endorse and privilege the work of technical experts. This does little to augment the accumulation of 
capital (social, economic, human or otherwise) of intended beneficiaries of technical assistance – the 
scheme staff and scheme members. Mechanisms for building positive bridging social capital in CBHI 
therefore ought to be explored. A related question is whether and how the advantages of bonding 
social capital could be sustained alongside increased horizontal and vertical bridging links.  
 
Alongside links with NGOs and civil society, the concept of ‘embeddedness’, also constituent of 
bridging social capital, suggests that local government structures can foster productive informal social 
relations between communities and local government officials (Evans, 1996). In CBHI, it is unclear 
whether structures could be developed to facilitate the personal engagement of local bureaucrats 
without increasing the possibility of corruption. Such an approach could be contrasted with more 
conventional “complementarity” (public/private division of labour) and laissez faire approaches, 
although it is worth noting that the latter may not be possible in cases where CBHI is to be scaled up 
and integrated into a government programme for universal coverage (such as social health insurance) 
as proposed by WHO (World Health Organization., 2005, World Health Organization, 2000). 
 
The process of working through the social capital framework has led us to the conclusion that certain 
types of social capital are probably a determinant of successful CBHI, but it has also led us to think 
beyond this. It is also proposed here that CBHI schemes may need to actively develop bridging 
relations to foster the types of social capital required to ensure they are aligned to local communities’ 
goals, power relations and values. For example, CBHI schemes could link into federations of 
community-based organizations with diverse political and economic interests, situating themselves in 
the broader regional or even national development agenda and increasing their inclusiveness locally. 
Or schemes may find they need to pursue diverse activities to complement insurance, such as income 
generation. Some schemes may need to develop norms and loyalties at the intersection between their 
administrative structure and local government and could grow into quasi-non-governmental 
organizations. These ideas have been gleaned from limited evidence. A greater understanding of what 
“bridging social capital” in CBHI might constitute is needed, something which would require 
practical, applied field research.  
 
So far, this discussion has not considered methodologies for primary research into the effects social 
capital on CBHI. Indicators of social capital have already been developed and these could be adapted 
for quantitative studies investigating the relationship between social capital and CBHI. Such a task 
would be no small undertaking. An in-depth literature review of research on social capital suggests 
that a number of serious conceptual and statistical problems exist with the current use of social capital 
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by social scientists, particularly in attributing causality to social capital in empirical studies (Durlauf, 
2004).  
 
The project of empirically measuring effects of social capital may also be limited for different, 
conceptual reasons. The argument has been made that such an undertaking is symptomatic of the 
increasing dominance of mainstream economics over other social sciences (Fine, 2001). We suggest 
that while applying the social capital framework to CBHI could indeed entail empirically testing a 
theory of the social conditions under which CBHI is successful, this is not the only possible research 
methodology. An alternative approach would be to employ the framework qualitatively, for example 
by using it to guide semi-structured interviews and anthropological fieldwork in order to advance 
CBHI policy analysis and to understand its social context. This would involve situating empirical or 
technical analyses (which have already been undertaken within existing economic and health system 
frameworks for CBHI) in praxis and taking account of context-dependent considerations, such as 
values, goals and power relations (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Such a process could result in the evolution of 
schemes that are structured and operate quite differently from those proposed under the economic and 
health system frameworks and that have quite different long term trajectories from the schemes 
emerging in the 19th century. 
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i Following the consensus that the optimal design for CBHI is schemes that are managed separately from the health 
care provider (Bennett, 2004a) the discussion in this paper excludes studies of provider-based CBHI schemes. 
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ii National data on population coverage of CHBI are unavailable in the literature, although a USAID presentation 
suggests coverage is no more than 1% in most low-income countries. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/8-24final.pdf 
Accessed 07.08.06 
iii While from a policy perspective the primary purpose of CBHI is not economic development - rather it is to improve 
access to health care services – CBHI is a financial mechanism, and as such is compared and contrasted within the 
framework with other forms economic development. 
iv This idea also corresponds with the theory in new institutional economics that in contexts where there is no formal 
third-party such as government or the judiciary to enforce constraints on human interaction, there is a need for 
informal constraints on human interaction, such as common values, repeat dealing, cultural homogeneity and kinship, 
to prevent corruption and inefficiency (North, 1990). 
v The other main method of enlarging risk pools is social reinsurance. This is seen an alternative to external 
subsidisation or contingency reserves as a means of protecting the scheme from financial instability from catastrophic 
events (Fairbank, 2003, Dror, 2001). However others have argued that although self-financing may be attractive, 
because the membership of schemes is usually limited to poor groups, it may be wiser to view CBHI as a supporting 
strategy to government financing rather than as an exclusive financing alternative (Bennett, 1998). 
vi Although previously RCMS schemes were government owned, schemes are now voluntary and are managed by a 
village or township committee. Schemes are separate from providers. Because of these features (privately owned, 
purchaser/provider split) RCMS is considered in this discussion of CBHI schemes. 
vii Embeddedness is a qualitatively different concept to the processes that constitute decentralization since it focuses 
on informal social relations which do not feature in decentralization models. 
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